Despite recent reforms, world agricultural markets remain highly distorted by government policies. Traditional indicators of those price distortions such as producer and consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs) can be poor guides to the policies' economic effects. Recent theoretical literature provides scalar index numbers of tradeand welfare-reducing effects of price and trade policies which this paper builds on to develop more-satisfactory indexes that can be generated using no more than the data used to generate PSEs and CSEs. We then exploit a new Agricultural Distortion database to provide time series estimates of index numbers for 75 developing and high-income countries over the past half century.
Introduction
Despite reforms over the past quarter-century, world agricultural markets remain highly distorted, and international trade in farm products has grown much slower than trade in non-farm goods. 1 Traditional indicators such as the nominal rate of tariff protection from import competition understate the degree of distortion if there are other border taxes or subsidies or quantitative restrictions, and even more so if there are also domestic producer or consumer taxes or subsidies on farm products. Better indicators are provided by the producer and consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs) of the OECD (2008) based on domestic to border price comparisons for high-income countries, and by the World Bank's new comparable estimates of nominal rates of assistance and consumer tax equivalents (NRAs and CTEs) for both highincome and developing countries as summarized by . 2 Those estimates can be used in national and global computable general equilibrium models to provide an indication of the true trade and welfare effects of such distortionary policies. However, such models typically are calibrated only for a recent (or not-so-recent) year, and so are incapable of providing estimates of trends over time; and they are not yet available for many smaller and poorer economies.
There is thus a need for better indicators over time of the trade-and welfare-reducing effects of price-distorting policies than the existing weighted average NRA/CTE (or PSE/CSE) 1 Based on a sample of 75 countries comprising more than 90% of global agriculture and 95% of the world's economy, estimates that the share of global production of agricultural goods that is exported has increased from 11% in the 1960s and 1970s to just 16% in 1990-2004 . When intra-EU trade is excluded, agriculture's share of global production exported was just 8% in 2004, compared with 31% for other primary products and 25% for all other goods, according to the GTAP Version 7 database (www.gtap.org). 2 The main difference between the PSE/CSE and NRA/CTE concepts is that the former are expressed as a percentage of the distorted price whereas the latter are a percentage of the undistorted price (and the CSE has the opposite sign to the CTE). The NRA and CTE values are identical if the only government interventions are at a country's border (such as a tariff on imports). In the case of agriculture, however, typically there are some domestic production or consumption taxes or subsidies also in place, so the NRA often differs from the CTE. estimates for the farm sector of a country. The key reason is that the process of generating those weighted averages can hide the fact that distortions vary across industries within the sector. This is especially problematic in cases where some industry NRAs are negative, as when trade taxes apply also to exports or when dual exchange rates operate. In those cases the sectoral mean NRA may be close to zero even though the trade-and welfare-reducing effects of the sector's interventions could be substantial. Further, the sectoral mean NRA may be the same in two countries and yet, if the variance of the NRA across industries within that sector is greater in one country, so too will be the welfare cost of its policies for that sector.
Recent theoretical literature provides partial equilibrium indicators of the trade-and welfare-reducing effects of import policies that belong to a family of indexes under the catch-all name of trade restrictiveness indexes. The purpose of this paper is to draw on that literature in order to develop indexes to capture national, regional and global distortions to sectoral incentives that are based directly on national estimates of individual product NRAs and CTEs. We then exploit the Agricultural Distortion database recently compiled by the World Bank to generate a time series of estimates of consistent indexes for the agricultural sector for both developing and high-income countries over the past half century. The World Bank global panel dataset, compiled by , contains comparable estimates of annual NRAs and CTEs for a wide range of agricultural products (covering around 70 percent of national agricultural production) for around 75 countries that together account for all but one-tenth of the world's population, GDP and agricultural output. Applying our indexes to these new data takes us much closer to understanding the true trade and welfare effects of farm policies without needing a detailed economy wide model. These better approximations of the trade and welfare effects of sectoral policies are generated with simplifying assumptions about price elasticities that mean we need no more than the same price and quantity data compiled to generate traditional indicators of price distortions such as the NRA and CTE. By assuming domestic price elasticities of supply are equal across commodities within a country, and likewise for elasticities of demand, the formula simplifies to a share-weighted function with shares of production and consumption as weights. This is the main contribution of this paper: to demonstrate how better indicators of sectoral policy distortions can be generated by policy analysts using a simple, elegant and theoretically meaningful methodology and no more data than simpler widely-used indicators. Our aim with these new measures is not to produce a substitute for detailed results from economy wide or sectoral models, but rather to provide better stand-alone indicators of the trade-and welfare-distorting effects of policies than are currently being generated with price and quantity data. Since these new indicators avoid having to select a pair of price elasticity estimates for each product of each country, they could be attractive and politically uncontroversial supplements to the current policy monitoring indicators generated by multilateral institutions such as the OECD and WTO.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After a brief literature review the following section presents the theory for estimating trade-and welfare-reduction indexes in the import-competing sub-sector. This is then extended to cover the exportables sub-sector. The World Bank's Agricultural Distortions database is then discussed, followed by presentations of the trade-and welfare-reduction indexes for all 75 countries studied in the Agricultural Distortions project and for key geographic regions and the world as a whole. We also decompose the contributions of individual countries and commodities to the global welfare reduction index.
Some concluding observations including caveats and directions for further research complete the paper.
The recent literature
There is a growing theoretical literature that identifies ways to measure the trade-and welfarereducing effects of international trade policy in scalar index numbers. This literature serves a key purpose: it overcomes aggregation problems (across different intervention measures and across industries) by using a theoretically sound aggregation procedure to answer precise questions regarding the trade or welfare reductions imposed by each country's trade policies. The literature has developed considerably over the past two decades, particularly with the theoretical advances by Anderson and Neary (summarized in and extended beyond their 2005 book) and the partial equilibrium simplifications by Feenstra (1995) .
Notwithstanding these advances, few consistently estimated indexes have yet been estimated across time, and even fewer across countries. A prominent exception is the work of Olarreaga (2008, 2009 ) who, following the approach of Feenstra, estimate a series for developing and developed countries. However, those authors provide estimates only for a snapshot in time (the mid-2000s) and based only on import barriers. 3 Most other studies have been country specific, such as an application by Anderson, Bannister and Neary (1995) to Mexican agriculture in the late 1980s.
The indicators we estimate are well grounded in the theory of trade restrictiveness indexes first developed by Anderson and Neary (2005) . Specifically, we define two indexes, and coin terms for them that are precise descriptors. The names we provide are a trade reduction index (TRI) and a welfare reduction index (WRI). 4 The TRI and WRI are computed from subindexes of the production and consumption sides of the market, which are derived from NRA and CTE estimates, respectively, across product groups. NRAs to producers and CTEs to consumers are required whenever there are domestic subsidies or taxes on production or consumption in addition to border measures -as so often is the case for foods and other farm products. Thus the indexes we estimate capture the aggregate trade-and welfare-reducing effects of all policies directly affecting consumer and producer prices of farm products from all sectoral price-distorting policy measures in place. 5
Defining the welfare and trade reduction indexes
The initial theoretical work by Anderson and Neary, leading to their 2005 book, sought to derive a general equilibrium measure of the welfare-reducing effects of trade restrictions in a country's import-competing sector. They call this the Trade Restrictiveness Index. The work is important in that it solved the problem of how to aggregate assistance across commodities in a theoretically meaningful way. They do so for a small, open economy in which imports are restricted by tariffs and non-tariff measures (NTMs). They then provide variants of the Trade 3 Those estimates, which rely mostly on reported tariff rates but include also estimated tariff equivalents of some non-tariff import measures, have been reported in the World Bank's Global Monitoring Report (e.g., World Bank 2008, pp. 121-23) . The present estimates, by contrast, rely on domestic to border price comparisons for each product and so directly capture the effects of all border measures as well as domestic behind-the-border price subsidies or taxes. 4 Our WRI measure is the Anderson and Neary (2005) trade restrictiveness index, and our TRI measure is their mercantilist trade restrictiveness index, with an extension to allow for differences between the NRA and the CTE rates for each good. 5 It should be kept in mind that these are partial equilibrium measures: relations of substitutability and complementarity between pairs of goods are all set to zero, and the indirect effects of policy measures applying to non-agricultural sectors are ignored. Also, we assume there are no externalities or market failures, hence no divergences between private and social marginal costs and benefits, including from such things as underinvestment in public goods.
Restrictiveness Index, including one based not on a welfare criterion but instead on an import volume criterion, which they call the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index.
We develop versions of each of those two indexes for situations where, in addition to import measures, there may be also export measures and/or direct domestic producer and consumer price distortions resulting from behind-the-border measures. 6 While these versions are less general than the Anderson and Neary indexes, in that they are partial rather than general equilibrium measures, they have the important advantage (particularly for agriculture) of being more comprehensive in terms of policy instrument coverage. Here they are developed first for agriculture's import-competing sub-sector and then for its exporting sub-sector.
The import-competing sub-sector
We take a particular country and assume it has a small open economy in which all markets are competitive. However, the market for an import good may be distorted by a tariff and/or other non-tariff border measures and/or behind-the-border measures such as domestic subsidies and price controls. An example is depicted in Figure 1 .
[INSERT Figure 1 here]
We first measure the effect of a country's distortions on its import volume, the TRI. This is defined as the uniform tariff rate which, if applied to all goods in the place of all actual border and behind-the-border price distortions, would result in the same reduction in the volume of imports (summed across products by valuing them at the undistorted border price) as the actual distortions.
Consider the market for one good, good i, which is distorted by a combination of measures that distort its consumer and producer prices. For the producers of the good, the distorted domestic producer price, , is related to the border price, p i * , by the relation, = p i * (1 + s i ) where s i is the rate of distortion of the producer price in proportional terms. For the consumers of the good, the distorted domestic consumer price, , is related to the border price by the relation,
where r i is the rate of distortion of the consumer price in proportional terms. In general, r i ≠ s i . Using these relations, the change in the value of imports in the market for good i is given by: 7
where the quantities of good i demanded and supplied, i x and i y , are functions just of their own domestic price: (
(The neglect of cross-price effects, among other things, is what makes the analysis partial equilibrium.)
Strictly speaking, this result holds only for small distortions. In reality rates of distortion may not be small. If, however, the demand and supply functions are linear over the relevant price range, the effect on imports is given by equation (1) with constant slopes of the demand and supply curves in Figure 1 ( and , respectively). If the functions are not linear, this expression provides an approximation to the loss.
C i i dp dx / P i i dp dy / With n importable goods subject to different levels of distortions, the aggregate reduction in imports, in the absence of cross-price effects in all markets, is given by:
Setting the result equal to the reduction in imports from a uniform tariff, T, we have *2 *2 *2
Solving for T, we get
and (3d)
R and are indices of average consumer and producer price distortions. They are arithmetic means. In the empirical section below, these are based respectively on Consumer Tax Equivalents (CTEs) and Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRAs) of various farm products.
S
Evidently, the uniform tariff T can be written as a weighted average of the level of distortions of consumer and producer prices. An important advantage of using this decomposition of the index into producer and consumer effects is that it treats correctly the effects of NTMs and domestic distortions that affect the two sides of the market differently.
In equation 3c (equation 3b), the weights for each commodity are proportional to the marginal response of domestic production (consumption) to changes in international free-trade prices. These weights can be written as, among other things, functions of the domestic price elasticities (at the protected trade situation) of supply and demand ( and , respectively):
From a practical viewpoint, the next two steps are key to the contribution of this paper. In the first step, if one is willing to assume domestic price elasticities of supply (demand) are equal across commodities -as is implicitly done when calculating the weighted average NRA (CTE) across industries within a sector or sub-sector -then the elasticities in the numerator and denominator of equation 4 cancel. This powerful simplifying assumption allows us (in the empirical section below) to find R (S) simply by aggregating the change in consumer (producer) prices across commodities and using as weights the sectoral share of each commodity's domestic value of consumption (production) at undistorted prices. That is, with this elasticity assumption, R and S are attainable with the same information as used to estimate the CTE and NRA -but As a special case, if r i = s i for all i, that is, if tariff rates are the only distortion, equation
(3) reduces to a much simpler form:
Here t i is the ad valorem tariff rate, which is equal to the rate of distortion of both consumer and producer prices, and is the elasticity of import demand at the free trade point. T is the mean of the tariff rates. This case can be used to obtain an alternative expression for the general case. But one must be careful, as this alternative form requires computing an importequivalent tariff rate for each tariff item when there is some distortion other than an ad valorem tariff. (The Appendix in Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009) derives the importequivalent tariff and the alternative expression.)
Now we turn to the measure of the effect of a country's distortions on its economic welfare, the WRI. The derivation follows the same steps as in the derivation of the TRI. This leads to a simple comparison of the two indexes.
The distortions in the market for good i create a welfare loss, . This loss is given by the sum of the change in producer plus consumer surplus net of the tariff revenue. This loss of producer and consumer surplus is given by:
9 If the aggregate demand and supply curves are linear, this would equate to an assumption that the aggregate demand and supply curves have the same slope, so that each side of the market contributes equally to the countryspecific TRI. 10 If the demand and supply curves happened to be linear, this would be the areas of the two triangles jcd and gfe in Figure 1 .
where the quantities of good i demanded and supplied, i x and i y , are again functions of own domestic price alone.
Strictly speaking, this result too holds only for small distortions. With non-trivial rates of distortion, the welfare losses are defined by the triangular-shaped areas under the demand and supply curves for the good. These areas can be obtained by integration. On the assumption that the demand and supply functions are linear as in Figure 1 , the welfare loss is again given by equation (6) with and being constant. If the functions are not linear, this expression provides an approximation to the loss.
In the special case where r i = s i = t i , the expression reduces to
Equation (7) yields the fundamental result that the loss from a tariff is proportional to the square of the tariff rate. This holds because the tariff rate determines both the price adjustment and the quantity response to this adjustment. 11 If r i ≠ s i , as is frequently true in agricultural markets, the expression in equation (6) yields the result that the consumer and the producer losses are each proportional to the square of the rate of distortion of the consumer or producer price, respectively.
With n importable goods subject to different levels of distortions, the aggregate welfare loss, in the absence of cross-price effects in all markets, is given by:
The uniform tariff rate, W, that generates an aggregate deadweight loss identical with that of the differentiated set of tariffs is determined by the following equation:
W is thus the uniform tariff which, if applied to all goods in the place of all actual tariffs and NTMs and other distortions, would result in the same aggregate loss of welfare as the actual distortions. Solving for W, we have:
with u i , v i , a and b as defined for equation 3 above. W is the desired Welfare Reduction Index, while R′ and are the contributions to W from consumer and producer price distortions, respectively. They, like their appropriately weighted average W, are means of order two. As with the index T, we can deal with, and analyse, the production and consumption sides of the sector separately. That is, S′ R′ and are attainable with the same information as used to estimate the CTE and NRA given the earlier price elasticity assumption -but they provide a better indication of the welfare-distorting effect of the traditional consumer or producer price measures.
S′
In equations 3 and 10, the weights in the construction of R′ , S′ and W are the same as the weights for R , and T except that, in the case of the TRI, arithmetic means of order one are constructed whereas in the case of the WRI they are means of order two. In the special case where r i = s i = t i for all i, equation 10 reduces to a much simpler form:
Further, if we assume that the elasticities of import demand for the various products are all equal, the weights are the share of imports of each good in total imports. This case can be used to obtain an alternative expression of the general case of the WRI. This is done in the Appendix in Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009) .
Adding the exportables sub-sector
The indexes can each be extended to include the exportables sub-sector. An export subsidy in the exportable sub-sector reduces welfare in the same way as an import tax in the import-competing sub-sector, but it increases trade whereas the import tariff reduces trade. For this reason, it is necessary to keep track of import and export price distortions separately, for both producers and consumers, for the purpose of estimating the full welfare and trade reduction indexes. In essence, this extension is done by extending the commodity set and keeping separate track of the subsets of import-competing and exportable goods.
The WRI for the whole tradables sector can be written as an expansion of equation 10 in which goods 1 to n are import-competing products and goods n+1 to z are exportables:
where the ω values are shares of the value of production (consumption) imported or exported as defined by: 
It can be seen that when including both import-competing and exportable sub-sectors, we continue to first aggregate for producers and consumers separately, where the weights for each sub-sector are the share of the sub-sectors' value of production (consumption) in the total value of production (consumption). Producer and consumer distortions are aggregated in the last step with the assumption that each of the two sides of the economy contributes equally to the overall WRI.
The resulting measure can be regarded as the import tax/export subsidy which, if applied uniformly to all products in the sector, would give the same loss of welfare as the combination of measures distorting consumer and producer prices in the import-competing and exportable sub-sectors.
The TRI can be similarly decomposed as follows:
where ω , a and b are as already defined, and are R and S from equation 3b and 3c, and These extensions of the TRI and the WRI for the exportables sub-sector have precisely the same properties as the indexes for the import-competing sector.
World Bank's Agricultural Distortions database
The database generated by the World Bank's Agricultural Distortions project compiled by , using a methodology summarized in , provides a timely opportunity to estimate a time series of national, regional and global welfare The most aggregated summaries of NRA and CTE estimates for covered products for developing and high-income countries are presented in Tables 1 and 2 . These support the widely held views that developing country governments had in place agricultural policies that effectively taxed their farmers through to the 1980s, and that the extent of those disincentives has lessened since then. The extent of taxation was of the order of 15+% from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s. Since then it has not only diminished but, on average, has become slightly positive. Table 1 also supports the view that the growth of agricultural protection in highincome countries has been going on since the 1950s, and began to reverse only in the latter 1980s. It is clear from Table 2 that consumers have experienced changes similar to producers in recent years. In developing countries, taxation was negative (i.e. consumer subsidization was positive) for most of the last 50 years. This has lessened since the 1990s. In high-income countries, the implicit taxation of consumers from agricultural support rose until the early 1990s but has fallen since then.
[INSERT Tables 1 and 2 For consumers in all four regions, agricultural policies have almost always involved some consumer subsidization. Since the 1980s, however, food consumer subsidization in Asia, Latin
America and Europe's transition economies has gradually disappeared and is now replaced by a small degree of taxation on average.
Within the farm sector of all regions, the average NRA for the import-competing subsector is well above that for the export sector, meaning there is an anti-trade bias in the structure of distortions. In the case of developing countries where the former NRA is positive and the latter negative, the two tend to offset each other such that the overall sectoral NRA is close to zero. Such a sectoral average can thus be misleading as an indication of the extent of distortion within the sector. It can also be misleading when compared across countries that have varying degrees of dispersion in their NRAs for different farm industries. Tables 1 and 3 ). For highincome countries, policies support both exporting and import-competing agricultural products and, even though they favour the latter much more heavily, the assistance to exporters offsets somewhat the anti-trade bias from the protection of import-competing producers in terms of their impacts on those countries' aggregate volume of trade in farm products. This is reflected in much smaller TRIs for high-income countries in the third as compared with the first row for high-income countries in Table 3 .
Measures of the welfare and trade reduction indexes
[INSERT Table 3 here]
The TRI correctly aggregates the restrictiveness of sub-sector policies that are masked in aggregate NRA and CTE measures, because they offset one another. Using the example of Africa in 1985-89 when the NRA was closest to zero, the TRI peaks at this time in a way that correctly identifies the trade-reducing effect of positive protection to the import-competing sub-sector and disprotection to the exportables sub-sector. 13 National TRIs and WRIs are aggregated across countries using an average of the value of consumption and production at undistorted prices. National and regional indexes for the 5-year periods are unweighted averages of the annual indexes. Table 4 reports the WRIs, again for agricultural import-competing products, exportables, and all covered tradable farm products from 1960 to 2007 for the five main studied regions and for the world as a whole. The WRI results for covered products show a similar pattern over the five regions: there is a constant or increasing tendency for policies to reduce welfare from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, but thereafter the opposite occurs in almost all regions. This pattern is generated by different policy regimes in different regions. In highincome countries, agriculture was assisted throughout the period, although it peaked in the 1980s (at around 60%) and thereafter fell. By contrast, in developing countries, agriculture was disprotected until the mid-1980s, and only thereafter did taxation of developing country farmers decline to the point that they received positive assistance by the turn of the century.
The first point to note about the WRI, then, is that it has the desirable property of correctly identifying the welfare consequences that result from both positive and negative assistance regimes for the sector.
[INSERT Table 4 here]
A second point to note is that the WRI provides a better indicator of the welfare cost of distortions than the average level of assistance or taxation in the Agricultural Distortions database (NRA and CTE in Tables 1 and 2) . Although the latter are a significant contribution in their own right, they can be misleading as a pair of indicators of the extent of the welfare costs of assistance or taxation. This is due to the inclusion in the WRI of the 'power of two'.
That is, a weighted arithmetic mean NRA and CTE does not fully reflect the welfare effects of agricultural distortions because the dispersion of that support or taxation across products has been ignored. By contrast, the WRI captures the higher welfare costs of high and peak levels of assistance or taxation. A good example of this is the WRI for high-income countries: the NRA series for high-income countries is everywhere positive, but the WRI series lies above the NRA series owing to its capturing of the dispersion of the NRA. That is, the WRI captures the so-called 'disparity' issue discussed in Lloyd (1974) : the larger the variance in assistance levels within a sector, the greater the potential for resources to be used in activities which do not maximize economic welfare.
A third point to note is that the WRI and its two components -unlike the arithmetic mean measures of assistance/taxation (the NRA and CTE) -reflect the true welfare cost of agricultural policies when they have offsetting components. This can be seen most clearly for the case of Africa where, in the latter half of 1980s, it was still taxing exportables but had moved (temporarily) from low to very high positive levels of protection for import-competing farm products (Table 1 ). In 1985-89 the weighted average NRA for African import-competing and exporting farmers was close to zero, yet the WRI for Africa peaks in that time period. That is, while at the aggregate level African farmers received almost no government assistance then, the welfare cost of the mixture of agricultural programs as a whole was at its highest.
The TRI generally shows greater variance than the WRI series. This is because the TRI measure is sensitive to switches from negative to positive rates of assistance. For example, a move from -30 to +30% rates of assistance would have little or no effect on the welfare consequences of the policy, but it could have a significant effect on trade restrictiveness: net imports of farm products would be greater when the NRA is negative than when it is positive, ceteris paribus.
What can be said about agricultural distortions in the world as a whole? The fact that NRAs for high-income and developing countries diverged (in opposite ways) away from zero in the first half of the period under study, and then converged toward zero in the most recent quarter-century, meant that their weighted average NRA traced out a fairly flat trend for the world, with a dip in the early 1980s. By contrast, Figure 2 shows the WRI and TRI for the world as a whole tracing out a hill-shaped path and thus providing less misleading indicators of the evolving disarray in world agricultural markets. Figure 2 suggests that the global welfare cost of distortions has been much higher than implied by the NRA, but more so in earlier decades than in the current one. Both the WRI and TRI for the world suggest that the disarray in world agricultural markets was slightly less by the early 2000s than it was in the early 1960s.
[INSERT Figure 2 here] Which countries or commodities contributed most to the decline in the WRI since the latter 1980s? Overall, the global WRI fell by nearly half from 1985-89 to 2000-04 (46%, whether measured in percentage terms or constant US dollars). 14 Table 5 reports the 14 To measure the global WRI in constant US dollars, we sum the national WRIs in constant dollars of all countries (obtained by multiplying the country WRIs in percentage terms by the average of the national value of production and consumption in constant 2000 $US, measured at undistorted prices). The fall in the WRI in constant dollar terms could be greater than the fall in the WRI in percentage terms if there was a real increase in the value of global agricultural production over time. Both our percentage and constant dollar falls in the WRI are 46%, indicating that the real value of global agriculture was stable over the period analysed. decomposition of this fall by region, country and agricultural commodity. At a regional level, the fall was due mostly to decreases in the welfare restrictiveness of policies in high-income countries and Asia. High-income countries contributed over half of the change in the WRI, and
Asia more than one-third (last column of Table 5 ). The higher agricultural output value of highincome countries meant that even though the change in the WRI for Asia was greater at 58%, as compared to 42% for high-income countries, the latter still contributed the most to the global WRI reduction. In high-income countries, the period under analysis was a time of moving some product-specific assistance to decoupled assistance. This potentially explains some of the fall in covered product assistance over the time period. As noted below, one area for further research would be to decompose the WRI by policy instrument, which would shed light on this aspect of the results. Among the Asian developing countries, China (and to a much lesser extent India)
contributed most significantly to the reduction in the global WRI, in line with the pursuit of other economic reforms. Some countries contributed to an increase in the global WRI, such as Korea, but their contributions are lot listed in Table 5 if they were less than 2% of the overall global change. The bottom part of Table 5 shows that milk, rice and the horticultural sub-sector were the most significant contributors by product to the decline in the WRI globally over the time period shown, accounting for around 70% of the total reduction, with meat accounting for another one-sixth. 15 [INSERT Table 5 here]
Concluding comments
This paper contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on trade and welfare reduction indexes. On the theory side, it develops a method of calculating the TRI and WRI directly from estimates of the rates of distortion of producer and consumer prices. The Appendix in Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009) shows that these calculations of the TRI and the WRI are equivalent to an alternative method using, for each good, a calculation of the trade-equivalent and the welfare-equivalent rates of trade taxation. The main contribution of the theoretical component of the paper is to demonstrate that policy analysts can estimate national, regional and global measures of distortions to agricultural markets that are superior to and yet use the same data as existing indicators, provided one is willing to make some simplifying assumptions about price elasticities. Furthermore, changes over time in the global indexes can be decomposed to reveal underlying contributions by country and commodity.
Empirically, the paper's contribution is to apply the methodology to generate time series of indexes for agricultural goods that are well-grounded in trade theory, account for different forms of price distortions, and can be decomposed into their component producer assistance and consumer tax measures. These indexes -full details of which have been made freely available by Anderson and Croser (2009) Both the WRI and TRI for the world as a whole trace out a hill-shaped path between 1960 and 2004, suggesting that the disarray in world agricultural markets worsened in the first half of that period but has improved considerably since then such that there are slightly less distortions now than in the early 1960s. Our decomposition underscores the importance of China in reducing global welfare distortions from agricultural policies since the 1980s, but the European Union and Japan have also contributed non-trivially to a fall in the global WRI over the past quarter-century.
Methodologically it would not be difficult to re-calculate the WRIs and TRIs that include actual own-price elasticity of supply and demand estimates once reliable commodityspecific estimates for each country become available. 16 Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) provide a methodology for estimating trade elasticities, so that may be able to be adapted to the agricultural distortions case. Further complexity could be added by including cross-price elasticities, although for agriculture the available estimates suggest that, apart from a few obvious exceptions, these are very low. One example is provided by Tyers and Anderson (1992, Appendix Tables A2 to A4 ).
In the meantime, we believe the transparency of the method in this paper, notwithstanding its simplifying elasticity assumption, has the potential to add significant value to many policy analyses. In developing countries especially, where input-output tables and associated CGE models are scarce or inaccurate and yet time series indicators of welfare and trade reducing effects of policies are desired for monitoring purposes, our approach could prove to be a very useful and low-cost substitute for such modeling.
An extension to this work could involve using the same methodology to construct index numbers of distortions not from the perspective of a single country but rather from a global view of individual commodity markets. A related extension could be to drill down to further understand the trends in the WRI and TRI presented above. We have decomposed the results to a regional, country and commodity level, but the NRA and CTE measures underlying the WRI and TRI are themselves derived from prices and different policy instruments. 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 . a Regional aggregates are weighted using the average of the value of production and the value of consumption at undistorted prices. b For Europe's transition economies, estimates start only in 1992. a European transition economies are not included as their data are unreliable prior to 1992. b Countries/commodities with a contribution to the decline in the global WRI in the range +2 to -2% are not shown. Some countries and commodities make a negative contribution (though none more than 2%) if their WRI (or share of the global WRI) increases over time, instead of decreasing in line with the overall global reduction. Since we sum across products at the country level to generate the TRI and WRI indexes, there are no estimates to insert in columns 1 and 2. Source: Authors' calculations based on product NRAs and CTEs in .
